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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

LORENZO H. HUBBARD,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 900128-CA
Priority No. 2

:
INTRODUCTION

In a per curiam memorandum decision (not for publication)
filed on November 14, 1990, this Court remanded this case to the
trial court for more detailed findings of fact supporting the
court's order denying Mr. Hubbard's motion to suppress evidence
seized in a warrantless search.

A copy of the opinion is attached

as Appendix 1.
Mr. Hubbard files this petition for rehearing, pursuant to
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 35, because this Court's decision
overlooks basic procedural standards designed to insure fair
administration of burdens of proof and standards designed to
conserve judicial resources.1

1. For discussion of the circumstances justifying a
petition for rehearing, see Brown v. Pickard, denying rehearing, 11
P. 512 (Utah 1886); and Cummings v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (Utah 1913).

ARGUMENT
I.
STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
AND JUDICIAL ECONOMY
COUNSEL AGAINST REMAND AND
COMPEL A DECISION ON THE MERITS BY THIS COURT.
A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THIS CASE
Mr. Hubbard entered a conditional no contest plea to one
count of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section 58-37-8 (R.
66-72).
The issue raised and briefed on the merits in Appellant's
brief, relating to the suppression of evidence seized in a
warrantless search, was properly raised at trial by trial counsel,
through a pretrial motion to suppress, supporting memorandum of
points and authorities, and oral argument after the evidentiary
hearing on the motion (R. 37-44; T. 31-36).
During the evidentiary hearing, the State went forward to
meet its burden to justify the warrantless search, and was not
limited by the trial court in any way during examination of
witnesses or during argument (T. 1-37).

The court adopted the

position argued by the prosecutor (T. 30-39) and the prosecutor
drafted the order denying suppression of the evidence, which order
contained the trial court's findings (R. 62-63).

- 2 -

On appeal, Mr. Hubbard submitted an opening brief
addressing the merits of the trial court's order deny suppression of
the evidence seized without a warrant.

See Appellant's brief, pages

1 through 23.
The State responded with a brief which did not address the
merits of the issue, but alleged that the facts in the record were
"greatly disputed", and that this Court could not perform meaningful
appellate review in the absence of additional findings of fact by
the trial court.

See Respondent's brief, pages 1 through 5.

In Mr. Hubbard's reply brief, he refuted the State's
position, noting that the only factual dispute in the case was not
important to the issues before this Court, noting that the record in
this case was adequate to facilitate this Court's disposition of the
case on the merits, and providing this Court with a copy of the
record in this case to support Mr. Hubbard's assertions.

See

Appellant's Reply brief, pages 1 through 3 and Appendix 1.
This Court issued its memorandum decision, agreeing with
the State that remand was necessary in order to facilitate
meaningful appellate review.

See Appendix 1 of this petition.

B. LEGAL ARGUMENT SUPPORTING REHEARING IN THIS CASE
1. THIS COURT'S DECISION FAILS TO RECOGNIZE
STANDARDS DESIGNED TO INSURE FAIR ADMINISTRATION
OF BURDENS OF PROOF AND STANDARDS DESIGNED TO
CONSERVE JUDICIAL RESOURCES.
This Court should reconsider its decision in light of
- 3 -

standards designed to insure fair administration of burdens of
proof, and in light of standards designed to conserve judicial
resources, discussed infra.
It was the State's burden of proof to justify the
warrantless search.

For a discussion of the State's burden of

proving that warrantless searches fall within an exception to the
warrant requirement, and the State's burden of proving voluntary,
untainted consent, see State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990).
Burdens of proof are not merely substantive, but encompass
procedural responsibilities as well.

As the court explained in

Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Company. 659 P.2d 1040
(Utah 1983),
For a question to be considered on appeal, the
record must clearly show that it was timely
presented to the trial court in a manner
sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon; we cannot
merely assume that it was properly raised. The
burden is on the parties to make certain that the
record they compile will adequately preserve
their arguments for review in the event of an
appeal.
Id. at 1045 (citations omitted).
The State was not limited in any way in its effort to
present evidence and argument in seeking to meet its burdens, and on
appeal, the State presented no explanation for its failure to meet
its substantive and procedural burdens of proof in the trial court.
The State's arguments were adopted by the trial court and
- 4 -

the State drafted the order at issue on appeal.

In Howard v.

Howard. 601 P.2d 931 (Utah 1979), the court explained why these
factors and policies of judicial economy counsel against a remand in
this case:
It is, of course, true that a party need not
request an amendment to the findings of fact at
the trial level in order to pursue an appeal
thereon. When, however, a party drafts findings
which are adopted by the court, and includes
therein no mention of a material allegation of
fact raised at trial, such party may be deemed to
have waived any objection to the failure of the
trial court to make such a finding. Such a
waiver must be considered conclusive on appeal.
To rule otherwise would permit a party tacitly to
omit a material finding of fact from the proposed
findings, and then pursue reversal as a matter of
law due to failure of the trial court to make
such a finding.
Id. at 935.
This Court allowed the State to successfully attack the
findings of the trial court for the first time on appeal.

This

Court's ruling thus appears to violate the standard rule articulated
by this Court in Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653 (Utah
App. 1989):
It is axiomatic that, before a party may advance
an issue on appeal, the record must clearly show
that it was timely presented to the trial court
in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling
thereon. Issues not raised in the trial court in
timely fashion are deemed waived, precluding this
court from considering their merits on appeal.
Id. at 655 (emphasis by the Court, citations omitted).
- 5 -

See also

American Coal Company v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 1984)(party
may not raise issue for the first time on appeal; in order to raise
issue before appellate court, party must file a cross appeal).
2. THIS COURT'S DECISION FAILS TO RECOGNIZE
THE BROAD CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION OF THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS AND MR, HUBBARD'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO APPEAL.
It was apparently this Court's opinion that factual and
mixed factual and legal findings underlying Mr, Hubbard's motion to
suppress must be made by the trial court.

See Appendix 1.

This

view is unduly limits this Court's jurisdiction and thereby
undercuts Mr. Hubbard's rights to appeal.2
The State Constitution was amended in 1984, and as of July
1, 1985, appellate jurisdiction over criminal cases is no longer
limited to legal issues.

Compare present Article VIII sections 3

and 5 (in 1990 pocket supplement) with previous Article VIII section
9 (in 1953 hardbound volume).3

2. Mr. Hubbard is constitutionally entitled to an appeal as
a matter of right. Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12 and
Article VIII section 5.
3. The current Article VIII section 3 provides,
The supreme court shall have original
jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and
to answer questions of state law certified by a
court of the United States. The supreme court
shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other
(continued)
- 6 -

There is no statutory definition of appeal limiting this
Court's jurisdiction to legal issues.
3. THIS COURT'S DECISION FAILS TO RECOGNIZE
THAT ON APPEAL, THIS COURT IS ENTITLED TO
RESOLVE CASES IN WHICH THE EVIDENCE IS UNDISPUTED.
In nominal reliance on State v. Lovegren, 143 Utah Adv.

(footnote 3 continued)
matters to be exercised as provided by statute,
and power to issue all writs and orders necessary
for the exercise of the supreme court's
jurisdiction or the complete determination of any
cause.
The current Article VIII section 5 provides,
The district court shall have original
jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by
this constitution or by statute, and power to
issue all extraordinary writs. The district
court shall have appellate jurisdiction as
provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all
other courts, both original and appellate, shall
be provided by statute. Except for matters filed
originally with the supreme court, there shall be
in all cases an appeal of right from the court of
original jurisdiction to a court with appellate
jurisdiction over the cause.
The previous Article VIII section 9 provided, in part,
From all final judgments of the district
courts, there shall be a right of appeal to the
Supreme Court. The appeal shall be upon the
record made in the court below and under such
regulations as may be provided by law. In equity
cases the appeal may be on questions of both law
and fact; in cases at law the appeal shall be on
questions of law alone. . . .
(emphasis added).
- 7 -

Rep. 9 (Utah Ct. App. Sept. 11, 1990), this Court remanded this case
to the trial court for additional findings.
and 2.

Slip opinion at 1

In so doing, this Court either accepted without scrutiny the

State's unsupportable assertion that the facts in this case "as in
Lovegren," are "greatly disputed,"4 or overlooked established law.
As the Utah Supreme Court has previously recognized,
[A] remand is not necessary if the evidence in
the record is undisputed and the appellate court
can fairly and properly resolve the case on the
record before it.
Flvina Diamond Oil v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618 (Utah 1989).
See also State v. Robinson and Towers, 140 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 19
(Utah Ct. App. 1990)("Although we would ordinarily remand for the
requisite finding on voluntariness and any necessary subsidiary
factual findings by the trial court as factfinder, we conclude that
the record at the suppression hearing is sufficiently detailed and
complete to allow us to determine on the undisputed facts whether
the State has met its burden of proof on the voluntariness
issue.")(citations omitted); Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 586-587

4. Appellee's brief at 5. As Mr. Hubbard argued in his
reply brief, and as can be confirmed by referring to the trial
transcript in the appendix to that reply brief, there are no
significant factual disputes in the record before this Court. The
only factual dispute that Mr. Hubbard's counsel was able to identify
was resolved against Mr. Hubbard by the trial court, and is
immaterial to the issues raised by Mr. Hubbard. See reply brief at
2 and 3.
- 8 -

n.l (Utah 1982)(appellate court is not bound by legal conclusions of
trial court, but may determine the question).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Because the material facts in this case are undisputed,
this Court should exercise its jurisdiction to reach the merits of
this case.

In so doing, this Court will inform the State that in

seeking to justify warrantless searches, this Court's standards of
basic fairness and judicial economy will neither tolerate nor
encourage substandard performance by the State in the trial courts.

This petition for rehearing is filed in good faith and not
for purposes of delay this Zj_ day of / \fi^Jf}^\}{/\

, 1990.

gKtZflBETO LHOILBROOK
Attorney fojr^Mr. Hubbard
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
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APPENDIX 1
OPINION OF THE COURT

FILED
mm 41990
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not for Publication)

v.
Case No. 900128-CA
Lorenzo H. Hubbard,
FILED

Defendant and Appellant.

(November 14, 1990)

Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Orme.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant Lorenzo H. Hubbard appeals from his conviction
of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp.
1990). On appeal, defendant requests this court to reverse and
remand for a new trial due to the trial court's alleged error
in denying his motion to suppress. The State argues this court
should remand to the trial court for more detailed findings of
fact. We agree and remand.
Because the issues presented in search and seizure cases
are highly fact sensitive, detailed findings are necessary for
this court to conduct meaningful appellate review. State v.
Lovearen, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 11 (Ct. App. Sept. 11, 1990).
Moreover, Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c) requires findings where
factual issues are involved in determining a motion.
Generally, this court will not disturb a trial court's findings
of fact underlying a motion to suppress unless they are clearly
erroneous. Id. However, such deference can only be accorded
when the findings disclose the steps by which the ultimate
conclusion on each factual issue was reached. Id.
On appeal, defendant claims the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress because: 1) the officer lacked
reasonable suspicion to justify the initial stop; 2) the
detention exceeded its proper scope; 3) the prosecution failed
to prove the consent was voluntary; 4) the consent was tainted
by a prior illegality; and 5) the officer exceeded the scope of
the consent. The trial court entered an order stating, in
part, "the Court then found there was consent to search the
car, the person of the defendant and the defendant's wallet;
that the consent was voluntarily given; that the investigatory

stop was justified." The court also made sketchy oral findings
involving whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to
justify the initial stop and whether the officer obtained
defendant's consent to search the vehicle and defendant's
wallet.
However, the findings entirely fail to address several of
the critical issues and are inadequate to provide meaningful
appellate review. "Though the decision not to suppress may
have been correct, the critical 'issues are for the trial court
to decide and . . . the findings of fact must reveal how the
court resolved each material issue.'" Id. As in Lovegren, we
reject defendant's contention that remand for findings is
unnecessary. Id. at 12 n.ll. We therefore remand for more
detailed factual findings.
ALL CONCUR:

Gregorjr^K.

Orme, J u d g e

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of November, 1990, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision was mailed to each
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Charles F. Loyd, Jr.
Ronald S. Fujino
Elizabeth Holbrook
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
Attorneys at Law
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
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R. Paul Van Dam
State Attorney General
Judith S.H. Atherton
Assistant Attorney General
Governmental Affairs
B U I L D I N G
MAIL
Honorable Frank G. Noel
Third District Court
Salt Lake County
#891901185

Julia C. Whitfield
Deputy Clerk
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